A decade and a half of deference (part 1) by Maree, P. J. H. & Quinot, Geo
TSAR 2016 . 2 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
A decade and a half of deference (part 1)*
PJH MAREE** 
GEO QUINOT***
1 Introduction
In 2000 Hoexter published an article on judicial review that became very influential 
in South African administrative-law scholarship and jurisprudence.
1
 In her article 
Hoexter raised the notion of deference in judicial review of administrative action.2 
While she concluded on the pessimistic note that “the debate about deference … will 
be cancelled owing to lack of interest”,
3
 her article has been cited with approval in 
a number of judgments, including the influential constitutional court judgment of 
O’Regan J in the Bato Star case.
4
A decade and a half later we take stock of the deference debate in South Africa. 
In her article, Hoexter concluded that the law-makers “got it wrong” regarding 
deference in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.
5
 We ask whether the 
courts got it right in enthusiastically taking up the notion of deference. We argue 
that despite the courts’ zeal in this regard, Hoexter correctly predicted that there 
would be no debate. In our view the courts have (at best) misunderstood Hoexter and 
seized upon the notion of deference in a manner that was never put forward. Instead 
of a debate on deference, deference has been applied as a fait accompli. We continue 
to explore how the notion of deference can be useful in debating particular aspects 
of South African administrative law under the constitution
6
 and how it cannot.
We start with a close reading of Hoexter’s 2000 article and of the cases adopting 
Hoexter’s description of deference. On the basis of this discussion we offer 
an assessment of Hoexter’s intention and compare it to subsequent takes on her 
work, in particular by courts. We argue that most (if not all) of these cases stray 
fundamentally from the debate Hoexter called for and that the cases are largely 
inconsistent. We subsequently return to the bases for a debate on deference in 
*  This article draws on Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System in South Africa 
(2013 diss U Stell) supervised by Prof Quinot. Our thanks to the Administrative Justice Group at 
Stellenbosch University for fruitful discussions on the issues raised in this paper and to Prof Hoexter 
for her comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
**  Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University.
*** Professor, Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University.
1 Hoexter “The future of judicial review in South African administrative law” 2000 SALJ 484.
2 In this article we use the term “judicial review” in a narrow sense to refer to judicial review of 
administrative action, since the article focuses on deference in the context of administrative law. 
However, we are not suggesting that deference is an issue only in administrative-law adjudication. A 
number of South African scholars have investigated the role of judicial deference in other contexts 
such as socio-economic-rights adjudication. See Brand “Judicial deference and democracy in 
socio-economic rights cases in South Africa” in Liebenberg and Quinot (eds) Law and Poverty: 
Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) 172; McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts 
and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009). 
3 Hoexter (n 1) 519.
4 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC).
5 Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
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administrative-law adjudication and explore the role that the notion of deference can 
play in this context within the particular South African administrative-law system. 
We conclude by renewing a call for a debate on deference and set out some of the 
contours of that debate as we see it. 
2 Deference in South Africa: the (non)debate to date
2.1 Hoexter’s article and subsequent work
In her article Hoexter called for the development of “an appropriate theory of 
deference”,
7
 situating her argument against the backdrop of the development of 
administrative law in South Africa.
8
 She pointed to the primacy accorded to judicial 
review as one of the few legal instruments available prior to democratisation to hold 
the state accountable. Within this context liberal administrative lawyers routinely 
pursued the expansion of review and grounds of review in order to extend the scope 
of judicial oversight of the bureaucracy. More judicial review was universally seen 
as a good thing. 
The constitution, however, drastically changed the legal landscape within which 
administrative law operates. The introduction of a bill of rights and constitutional 
supremacy meant that administrative law no longer had to do all the work. The need 
for expansive judicial review powers was far less. On the contrary, Hoexter noted 
that “unbridled judicial activism” holds particular dangers and may be particularly 
inappropriate in the South African context given the public administration’s social-
justice mandate under the constitution. 
These developments called for a re-evaluation of the role of judicial review within 
the administrative-law system, which is essentially what Hoexter proposed. Her 
point of departure was the conceptualisation of the role of judicial review within the 
framework of a culture of justification as put forward by Mureinik.9 Hoexter noted 
that our new constitutional dispensation “requires justification for the exercise of 
judicial power as much as any other sort of power”.
10
 What was consequently needed 
in respect of judicial review was, in Cockrell’s words, “the articulation of rigorous 
and coherent principles that will guide legal intervention and non-intervention”.
11
 
This is the role for a theory of deference Hoexter had in mind. She also elaborated 
on the nature of her idea of deference:
“the sort of deference we should be aspiring to consists of a judicial willingness to appreciate the 
legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of administrative agencies; to admit the expertise 
of those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues; to accord their interpretations of fact and law 
due respect; and to be sensitive in general to the interests legitimately pursued by administrative 
bodies and the practical and financial constraints under which they operate. This type of deference 
is perfectly consistent with a concern for individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and 
maladministration. It ought to be shaped not by an unwillingness to scrutinize administrative action, 
but by a careful weighing up of the need for – and the consequences of – judicial intervention”.
12
 
7 Hoexter (n 1) 484.
8 Hoexter (n 1) 485-494.
9 Mureinik “A bridge to where? Introducing the interim bill of rights” 1994 SAJHR 31 32.
10 Hoexter (n 1) 500.
11 Cockrell “‘Can you paradigm?’ – another perspective on the public law/private law divide” in 
Bennett et al (eds) Administrative Law Reform (1993) 247, quoted by Hoexter (n 1) 500.
12 Hoexter (n 1) 501-502 (footnotes omitted).
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The remainder of the article explored a number of themes that Hoexter considered 
“particularly important in giving shape to an appropriate theory of deference in 
South African administrative law”.
13
 These sections provided some indication of the 
contours and elements of the contemplated theory. Under the theme of “variability” 
Hoexter indicated that deference can be linked to “the intensity of judicial scrutiny” 
applied in a given case.
14
 She indicated that administrative action need not always 
be held to the same standard under the same administrative-law rules. Hoexter 
clearly had two distinct aspects of judicial review in mind here. Firstly, there can 
be variability in the standard of review that is applied to the action. Secondly, there 
can be variability in the courts’ “willingness to intervene in a particular case” once 
it has found the action potentially wanting in the first stage. She listed some factors 
that may inform this type of variability: policy in the decision, scope of discretion, 
expertise, impact, “degree of public participation” in taking the decision, and 
availability of internal remedies.
15 Hoexter also indicated that the theory must be 
premised on “the minimum content of administrative justice”.
16
 Deference involves 
the choice of moving beyond that minimum content.
Hoexter’s conception of deference clearly also relates to the amenability of actions 
to judicial review. Under her theme of “administrative action” she discussed in detail 
what type of actions are subject to judicial review and how such actions are to be 
identified.17 However, she also warned against using the justiciability threshold too 
broadly when redrawing the boundaries of judicial review. Rather, Hoexter called 
for justiciability and variability to be viewed together so that use of the latter can 
reduce reliance on the former. 
Finally, Hoexter indicated that deference impacts on the content of particular 
rules of administrative law. She focused on the constitutional requirement that 
all administrative action must be reasonable and showed how that rule can have a 
variety of meanings. An approach in terms of deference insists on the recognition of 
“legitimate diversity” at the heart of this rule.
18
 
Hoexter concluded her article by showing how the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act had failed to respond meaningfully to the need for a theory of deference. 
She was particularly critical of the definition of “administrative action” in section 
1 of the act and the reasonableness ground of review in section 6(2)(h), noting that 
section 1 “does little to advance the debate about deference” and that neither section 
will contribute to lawyers spending their time “working out the factors relevant to 
judicial intervention and non-intervention”.
19
 
Thus, the argument Hoexter proffered in her article was the dire need for a theory 
of deference, given the absence of such a theory in South African administrative 
law. While she indicated what might contribute to the development of such a theory, 
she noted that at least the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act did not support 
13 Hoexter (n 1) 502.
14 Hoexter (n 1) 502.
15 Hoexter (n 1) 503.
16 Hoexter (n 1) 504.
17 Hoexter (n 1) 505-509.
18 Hoexter (n 1) 512. Thus, Hoexter foreshadows the interpretation of the reasonableness standard 
later adopted in the Bato Star case (n 4). However, Hoexter seems to indicate that the variability of 
reasonableness is itself deferential. Once the standard of review has been determined in relation to 
the circumstances of the case, the reasonableness test can be applied. The question is whether the 
court has to assume a deferential stance in applying the reasonableness test, by not scrutinising a 
purported rational connection too closely, for instance.
19 Hoexter (n 1) 517, 519.
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such a development. Her diagnosis was that a “rich debate about deference” would 
in all likelihood not take place in South Africa.
20
 A theory of deference would 
accordingly not develop. 
In Hoexter’s subsequent work, she has affirmed the persisting need for “the 
development of a doctrine of deference”, despite the changed political circumstances 
since 2000,
21
 the transformation of the judiciary
22
 and a clearer understanding of 
the role of courts in our democratic system.
23 In these writings Hoexter confirmed 
that there is no theory of deference in South Africa yet and that she has not put 
forward such a complete theory. She refers to her contributions in this regard as a 
“view of deference, because ‘theory’ is too ambitious a word”.
24
 
2.2 The courts
Despite Hoexter’s intention to introduce a debate, the South African courts have 
applied her description of deference as a legal definition and principle. The higher 
courts have contributed little to the development of the content of deference and their 
treatment of the notion reveals a distinct ambivalence to deference’s constitutional 
pedigree and its role in administrative-law adjudication.
25
 
The first judgment in which the higher courts expressly noted the principle of 
deference was Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO.
26
 In this case Cameron 
JA identifies the task before the decision-maker as a “prime instance of what 
commentators have dubbed ‘polycentric decision-making’”.
27
 The decision was 
characterised as polycentric because various public interests required balancing, 
such as the “fair reconsideration of the appellant’s tender” and the “broader 
responsibilities” of the decision-maker.
28 The court finds that “[i]t is in just such 
circumstances that a measure of judicial deference is appropriate to the complexity 
of the task that confronted” the decision-maker.
29
 Thus, where a decision-maker 
is confronted with a polycentric issue the court should act with judicial deference 
because of the complexity of the decision. The court quotes from Hoexter’s 2000 
article and endorses her description of judicial deference.
30
 On this basis, the 
court finds that the “conclusion is unavoidable” that the decision-maker “acted 
20 Hoexter (n 1) 485.
21 When Hoexter put forward the need for a debate on courts’ intervention and non-intervention in 
2000, South African democracy was just over five years old and the first national and provincial 
elections under the final constitution had recently been held, compared to 21 years of democracy 
with four free and fair national and provincial rounds of elections by 2015.
22 For example, in 1994 only three of the 166 judges were black, compared to 2014 when 63% of judges 
were black, including all but one head of court. Regarding gender, there were only two female judges 
in 1994 compared to 81 in 2015; Albertyn “Judicial diversity” in Hoexter and Olivier (eds) The 
Judiciary in South Africa (2014) 275; Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Justice 
Today (August 2015) 5.
23 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 147. 
24 Hoexter (n 23) 151.
25 Contrast, for instance, Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management 2006 2 SA 191 (SCA) with Associated 
Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA).
26 2003 2 SA 460 (SCA).
27 the Logbro case (n 26) par 20.
28 the Logbro case (n 26) par 20.
29 the Logbro case (n 26) par 21. This raises the question whether the deference referred to by Cameron 
JA operates in addition to the distinction between appeal and review, constitutional constraints on 
the branches of state and the existing rules of litigation, or whether deference describes these limits 
of the judicial function.
30 the Logbro case (n 26) par 21.
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unimpeachably” in taking supervening circumstances into consideration. Deference 
thus comes into play in the court’s assessment of the fairness of the administrator’s 
conduct (while deciding on the merits of the ground of review).
31
 The court makes 
this finding without further explaining why deference is required at polycentric 
decision-making, why deference is appropriate under the circumstances of the 
particular case, or what role deference plays in the case. Arguably, the court could 
have reached the same conclusion on the basis of the distinction between appeal and 
review
32
 or simply with reference to the separation of powers.
33
Subsequently, in Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili 
Fisheries (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd,
34
 Schutz JA reviewed a decision on reasonableness grounds, 
among others. The court found that since the decision-maker “[had] a wide 
discretion to strike a balance, in furtherance of the objectives and principles” of 
the relevant legislation and was “[giving] effect to government economic policies”, 
“judicial review of the exercise of powers calls for deference, in the sense stated in 
Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO”.
35
 
The court quotes
36
 from Du Plessis v De Klerk
37
 and S v Lawrence
38
 for authority 
that courts are not adept at factual, economic or political inquiries,
39
 that courts 
should therefore exercise restraint in making findings on them, and that this restraint 
is linked to the different roles of the courts and other branches. The court elaborates 
along this vein in characterising the decision as polycentric and states that the court 
cannot prefer one decision over another on the basis that the one is better than the 
other.
40
 As authority for this statement, the court quotes
41
 from Bel Porto School 
Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape,
42
 where Chaskalson P said that “[c]ourts 
cannot interfere with rational decisions of the Executive that have been made 
lawfully, on the grounds that they consider that a different decision would have been 
preferable”. The court’s function is not to test the correctness or the “substance” of 
31 The court paints “the core of the appellant’s case” here as the argument that the administrator acted 
“capriciously or for an improper or unjustified reason”, which could be viewed as either a lawfulness 
or reasonableness argument.
32 The courts often refer to their awareness of the distinction between review and appeal, possibly 
to allay fears of judicial overreach. In Carephone v Marcus 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC) the purpose of 
considering the merits of a decision under review was distinguished from taking the administrator’s 
place, thus retaining the distinction between review and appeal in the face of review for substantive 
fairness, that is reasonableness. Essentially the judiciary does not perform the executive function 
in scrutinising in detail the merits of a decision; the purpose of the scrutiny is the distinguishing 
factor. A court does not consider the merits in order to take a new decision or to pronounce on the 
desirability of the decision, but to determine whether the executive function has in actual fact been 
performed, or whether the executive branch has exceeded its powers. Depending on the matter at 
hand, this determination may require varying levels of scrutiny. That complex matters may be less 
protected than simple matters, because of the role of deference in instances of review of “polycentric 
decision-making”, is concerning in a system of constitutional supremacy. The temptation arises to 
frame arguments demonstrating the complexity of a matter rather than justifying it.
33 It is not clear whether the court is describing the nature of review or whether it is describing deference 
as a principle additional or new to the distinction between appeal and review.
34 2003 6 SA 407 (SCA).
35 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 47.
36 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 48-49.
37 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) par 180.
38 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) par 42.
39 See, generally, Fuller “The forms and limits of adjudication” 1978 Harvard Law Review 353-409.
40 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 51.
41 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 51.
42 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) par 45.
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the decision, but the “procedure by means of which it was arrived at”,
43
 otherwise 
the distinction between review and appeal is lost.
44
 
The court points out that judicial deference “simply manifests the recognition that 
the law itself places certain administrative actions in the hands of the Executive, not 
the Judiciary”.
45
 This amounts to no more than a clear statement of the separation 
of powers in terms of which different functions are apportioned to the branches of 
the state. In concluding the discussion on the alleged capriciousness of the decision, 
the court summarises this preceding reasoning:
“Judicial deference is particularly appropriate where the subject matter of an administrative action 
is very technical or of a kind in which a Court has no particular proficiency. We cannot even pretend 
to have the skills and access to knowledge that is available to the Chief Director [the decision-
maker]. It is not our task to better his allocations, unless we should conclude that his decision cannot 
be sustained on rational grounds.”
46
With that the court finds that the application fails on reasonableness grounds. 
Deference and rationality are interwoven in this discussion. Although the supreme 
court of appeal clearly identifies the facts upon which the decision was made,47 why 
they were relevant
48
 and why the decision-maker dealt with them rationally in the 
circumstances,
49
 it is unclear what role deference plays or should play in the analysis 
of the reasonableness of decisions or how the analysis would have differed without 
deference.
The Phambili Fisheries matter came before the constitutional court on appeal 
in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs,
50
 which has 
subsequently become the standard case on deference in administrative-law 
adjudication.
51
 In one of the two majority judgments, O’Regan J discusses deference 
under the heading of reasonableness.
52
 Thus, in this judgment deference seems to 
be treated as an aspect of reasonableness review. With reference to Hoexter’s 2000 
article the constitutional court endorses
53
 the supreme court of appeal’s negative 
43 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 52.
44 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 52. The court’s reasoning could simply have been based on the 
nature of review. Citing deference does not clarify the court’s approach to review.
45 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 50. The court’s discussion of deference takes the nature 
of administrative decision-making, as well as the constitutional status of the administration, into 
consideration. However, the court does not weigh these considerations against constitutional 
supremacy and the constitutional court’s role as final arbiter on constitutional matters. It is 
concerning that the judiciary’s descriptions of deference would not seem out of place within a system 
of parliamentary sovereignty.
46 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 53. Unfortunately this paragraph raises as many questions as 
it attempts to answer. Does the word “unless” in this paragraph suggest that no deference is due if 
a decision is irrational? How does the court apply deference to determine whether the decision is 
rational or not in the first place?
47 See, eg, the court’s approval of the reasons furnished by the decision-maker – the Phambili Fisheries 
case (n 33) par 39-45.
48 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 54.
49 the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 41-43, 45, 51 (the decision-maker “[was] obliged to have regard 
to a broad band of considerations and the interests of all that may be affected”).
50 (n 4). 
51 See, eg, Nyathi v MEC for Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC), where Madala J 
held that “[t]he separation of powers doctrine needs to be respected and due deference afforded to 
the other arms of government, especially when the matter relates to complex procedures beyond 
the expertise of this Court”. Madala J refers to the Bato Star case as authority for the meaning of 
deference and for the contention that deference flows from the separation of powers (par 88).
52 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 41.
53 Bato Star case (n 4) par 46.
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description of deference: “[j]udicial deference does not imply judicial timidity or 
an unreadiness to perform the judicial function”.
54
 O’Regan J clearly states that 
deference or respect derives from the doctrine of separation of powers. She quotes
55
 
from the House of Lords judgment, R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v 
British Broadcasting Corporation,
56
 where Lord Hoffmann indicates that
“[i]n a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to decide 
which branch of government has in any particular instance the decision-making power and what the 
limits of that power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts.”
57
Lord Hoffmann reasons that where a court determines the decision-making 
competence of any branch of state, it is merely deciding the law.
58
 The decision-
making competence of a branch is determined by the separation of powers. Where a 
court determines the content of the separation of powers and other law in the context 
of allocating powers it is not acting with deference and is not required to act out of 
deference. 
O’Regan J adopts this analysis to hold that, “[i]n treating the decisions of 
administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a Court is recognising the 
proper role of the Executive within the Constitution”.59 In other words, respect 
amounts to an appreciation of competence. However, we submit that this amounts 
to nothing more than an application of the separation of powers. Deriving deference 
from the separation of powers in this manner is problematic, and we shall return 
below to the link between separation of powers and deference. At this point it is 
worth noting a few questions that emerge from this alignment of deference and 
separation of powers. How does deference influence the court’s approach to 
judicial scrutiny in cases where both parties are organs of state? Should a court 
defer when the administration believes it has erred in its original decision? Does 
the court defer to the argument brought to court, to the original decision or both? 
How does this differ from an ordinary case between a private citizen and the state? 
Finally, does deference apply whenever the administration acts, or only when it 
performs administrative action? If the latter, why would deference not be relevant to 
administrative action performed by a decision-maker that is not an organ of state?
O’Regan J also attempts to combine the idea of respect and reasonableness review 
in the following terms:
“A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or 
considerations and which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise in that area 
must be shown respect by the Courts. Often a power will identify a goal to be achieved, but will not 
dictate which route should be followed to achieve that goal. In such circumstances a Court should 
pay due respect to the route selected by the decision-maker. This does not mean however that where 
the decision is one which will not reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not 
54 Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 50.
55 Bato Star case (n 4) par 47.
56 2003 2 All ER 977 (HL).
57 the ProLife Alliance case (n 56) par 75.
58 the ProLife Alliance case (n 56) par 76.
59 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 48. However, “the proper role of the executive” is not absolute. The 
constitutional role of the executive only has meaning in relation to the constitutional roles of the 
other branches; when their roles change the other branches will be affected.
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reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a Court 
may not review that decision.”
60
 
If the reasonableness of the decision is the decisive criterion, what role does deference 
play? It seems that no deference is due to an unreasonable decision; the court must 
declare it invalid. Does deference make any difference, then? The court is obliged to 
consider the arguments of both parties as a matter of procedure in line with section 
34 of the constitution. What does showing respect add to the proceedings in actual 
fact?
O’Regan J has already indicated that respect requires courts to acknowledge the 
proper role of the executive when she pointed out that deference cannot preclude 
review on reasonableness grounds. How are courts to acknowledge the proper role 
of the executive where an executive decision is scrutinised, though? This question 
is the crux of how respect and reasonableness review interact. In the preceding 
quotation, O’Regan J says that where the executive has a polycentric issue before 
it, or has a discretion regarding the route to be taken, courts must respect the 
decision. Thus, courts can respect the proper role of the executive by respecting the 
executive’s decision. In our view this is not particularly helpful as it merely shifts 
the question to: how do courts respect executive decisions under reasonableness 
review? Furthermore, O’Regan J qualifies the entire approach by stating that respect 
cannot preclude review for unreasonableness.
61
 
If the decision-maker “did take into account all the factors, struck a reasonable 
equilibrium between them and selected reasonable means to pursue the identified 
legislative goal in the light of the facts before him”
62
 a reasonableness challenge 
cannot succeed. Thus “[t]he court’s task is merely to determine whether the decision 
made is one which achieves a reasonable equilibrium in the circumstances”;
63
 
regardless of the respect the courts owe to executive decisions, such decisions will 
always be subject to reasonableness review. Initially, in quoting Lord Hoffmann, 
O’Regan J seems to state that respect is at least a factor in deciding whether a 
decision is reviewable under the rubric of competence.
64
 By then qualifying this 
assertion, respect becomes a factor in reasonableness review. The question remains, 
how does respect operate in reasonableness review? 
O’Regan J partially detracts from her original position that respect originates 
in the separation of powers and that respect is concerned with competence: she 
explicitly considers respect and reasonableness review together. Lord Hoffmann 
analyses deference as a principle determining and allocating the competences of 
the branches of government and does not seem to see a need for such a principle.
65
 
O’Regan J, however, applies Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning in the context of 
reasonableness review which is concerned not with the allocation of power, but 
with the manner in which that power is exercised. The allocation of power and 
60 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 48 (emphasis added). O’Regan J alludes to complexity and expertise 
as factors triggering the need for deference. However, the emphasis on the separation of powers 
suggests that it is the identity of the decision-maker as an independent branch that triggers deference, 
rather than the nature of the decision. If the nature of the decision is decisive it is difficult to see how 
decisions taken by decision-makers outside of the separation of powers are not also owed deference. 
If respecting the proper role of the executive is the ultimate concern of deference, then arguably 
deference would be due to simple decisions taken by low-ranking officials especially.
61 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 48.
62 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 50.
63 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 49.
64 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 47.
65 the ProLife Alliance case (n 56) par 74-77.
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the content of that power are related but distinguishable. For instance, where the 
separation of powers allocates the judicial function, ie the function of stating the 
law, to the judiciary this allocation in itself does not define the content of the judicial 
function. However, where deference informs reasonableness review the content of 
the judicial function, in relation to the administrative function, is affected. This 
raises the question whether deference is concerned with the allocation of powers, 
the scope of powers or both? Seemingly, deference is a principle that permeates law 
in a very wide sense, from the inquiry of the allocation of functions to the content 
and application of those functions. 
The fact that courts cannot interfere with different options falling within the 
boundaries of reasonableness, even where one decision is patently better than 
another, is in itself an acknowledgement of the constitutionally ordained function 
of the executive branch and, therefore, an incidence of deference as employed by 
O’Regan J. The scope of reasonableness review derives from the nature of judicial 
review, which maintains the difference between review and appeal. In this sense, 
deference does nothing new. Thus, is deference merely descriptive, describing the 
courts’ position in relation to the executive during review proceedings as opposed to 
appeal or does it add something new or different to judicial review?
In a subsequent judgment in the Foodcorp case,
66
 Harms JA refers to the view 
of the court a quo on deference: “this was one of those cases in which due judicial 
deference should be accorded to policy-laden and polycentric administrative acts 
that entail a degree of specialist knowledge and expertise that very few, if any, 
judges may be expected to have”.67 
The administrative decision to which deference was ostensibly due was based 
on an algorithm that a professor of mathematics had developed.
68
 On appeal the 
appellant asked for the mechanical application of the formula to be reviewed in 
terms of section 6(2)(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.
69
 The 
formula itself was not challenged.
70
Harms JA explains his understanding of deference with reference to the Bato Star 
case, noting “[i]n exercising its review jurisdiction a court must treat administrative 
decisions with ‘deference’ by taking into account and respecting the division of 
powers inherent in the Constitution”.
71 Here, once again, an aspect of the definition 
of the separation of powers is stated succinctly. Thus, Harms JA does not contribute 
to the content of deference. It seems, however, that deference is a feature of the 
review process itself and its content amounts to recognition of the allocation of 
functions.
After considering the outcome of the formula’s application, Harms JA responds to 
the high court’s view on deference: “[o]ne does not need to understand the ‘complex 
processes, mathematical or otherwise’ … to realise that at least some of the results 
produced by the simple application of the formula were irrational and inexplicable 
and consequently unreasonable”.
72
66 (n 25).
67 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 2.
68 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 8.
69 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 11-14.
70 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 13.
71 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 12 (emphasis added).
72 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 18. 
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Harms JA does not explain at all why the results are irrational. He states that the 
appellant was “prejudiced” without explaining why.73 He notes certain differences 
in allocation and that there were “glaring anomalies”,
74 without explaining why 
these differences amount to anomalies. In this context, it is rather puzzling that 
Harms JA concludes that the “simple application of the formula” was unreasonable. 
Assuming that “some” of the results were “irrational and inexplicable”, and Harms 
JA does not specify whether he means inexplicable in terms of formal logic, statistics, 
mathematics, law or a combination of these, an imperfect formula does not necessarily 
make the decision unreasonable in terms of administrative law: Harms JA would 
have to explain why some distorted results render the decision unreasonable in law. 
It could be that some distorted results are unavoidable given the complexity of the 
matter. It could be that this formula produced the least distorted output. Strangely, 
having said that the formula itself is not at issue, Harms JA mentions that noticing 
the anomalies would have called for “[a] reconsideration of the formula”. Above 
all, it is unclear how one could know that the output is irrational without knowing 
exactly how the mathematical formula producing the output operates. The terms of 
the formula would at least partially dictate whether any result was distorted or not; 
one would expect deference to enter the analysis at this point. Furthermore, whether 
these inconsistencies result in prejudice or favour is not a given and, as mentioned, 
the presence of prejudice or favour does not necessarily make the application of the 
formula unreasonable in law. Occasional mathematical or statistical inconsistency 
does not automatically amount to unreasonableness in law.
75
It appears that where the unreasonableness of the decision is apparent without the 
need for non-judicial expertise in the court’s view, little or no deference is due. This 
approach raises several questions. If deference flows from the separation of powers, 
why is it not relevant whenever the administration performs an administrative 
function? Why should the court not defer to the administration’s decision to apply 
the formula mechanically? These questions are not addressed by the court, though, 
despite Harms JA’s reference to the separation of powers and the allocation of 
functions.
In the Foodcorp case the formula for the allocation of fish quotas was developed 
by the department of environmental affairs and tourism in terms of the Marine 
Living Resources Act
76 with the expert assistance of a mathematician.77 Thus the 
administration was closely involved in the process leading to the final formula. As a 
result, considering the crucial link between the separation of powers and deference 
that was established in the Bato Star case, the presence of administrative expertise 
and experience is apparent and the reference to deference understandable. What is 
puzzling is that Harms JA does not find it necessary to rely on deference to come 
to his decision.
The Foodcorp case seems to reflect the ambivalence in the Bato Star case about 
treating administrators’ expert decisions with respect on the one hand and the courts’ 
73 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 19.
74 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 14-18.
75 Cf the opinion of the experts who created and applied the formula, Butterworth, De Oliveira and De 
Moor “Are South African administrative law procedures adequate for the evaluation of issues resting 
on scientific analyses?” 2012 SALJ 461-477. Ultimately the Foodcorp case provides no guidance to 
decision-makers on how they should proceed in the future.
76 18 of 1998.
77 the Foodcorp case (n 25) par 1, 3-4, 8.
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independent assessment of the reasonableness of such decisions on the other. While 
the former can be labelled as deference, it is seemingly cancelled by the latter. 
In the case of Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl
78
 the link between 
administrative expertise and deference appears more tenuous. The central issue was 
the methodology adopted by the actuary for the appellants, an organ of state, in the 
determination of a formula for the transfer of pension funds.
79 Brand JA explains 
the relevance of deference to the case as follows: “Particularly in the light of the 
training, skills, experience and intricacies involved in the application of actuarial 
science, I believe that this is a matter where judicial deference is appropriate.”
80
The key question to ask in light of the preceding quotation is whether the expertise 
that ostensibly triggered deference in this matter is linked adequately to the 
administrative function. Or, is deference triggered purely by the technical expertise 
of the actuary? It would be curious if the court owed the actuary any deference, in 
the Bato Star sense, purely because of his expertise, which is completely divorced 
from the position of the administrative decision-maker.
81
 Such a view would be 
difficult to reconcile with the repeated alignment of deference with the separation 
of powers. 
In this case, as with most others discussed above, it is difficult to see what role 
deference plays in the analysis. By the time Brand JA refers to deference he has 
already found the actuary’s calculation rational on established rules of reasonableness 
review and without any reliance on deference. This case also raises a number of 
questions concerning the content of deference, particularly where expertise in a 
particular field is required, but it is neither the administrator who possesses that 
expertise nor is it clear that the expertise relates to the administrative function at 
hand. The case law discussed above indicates that in certain circumstances the 
court should defer to the relative expertise of the administrator. However, in the 
Van Zyl case, the court purports to defer to actuarial determinations
82
 with little 
or any involvement of administrators. This points to an unresolved inquiry in the 
application of deference: once it has been shown that courts should defer to relative 
expertise these questions remain: “expertise in relation to what?” and “the expertise 
of whom?” A principle of deference to mere expertise as such could entail absurd 
implications: the administration could, for example, consult or employ experts 
simply to activate due deference. If expertise per se becomes the justification for 
deference, the constitutional basis for deference in the separation of powers also 
becomes questionable. And finally, why would deference come into play in these 
cases, but not other instances of adjudication involving highly technical questions?
83
 
78 (n 25).
79 the Van Zyl case (n 25) par 9, 17-18, 35. Should the court not have assessed the question whether the 
administrator acted reasonably in relying on this particular actuary?
80 the Van Zyl case (n 25) par 39.
81 Particular questions that emerge in this context and that remain unanswered include the following. 
What makes an administrator an expert administrator, as opposed to an expert in another discipline 
such as actuarial science? Why would one recognise actuarial expertise rather than expertise in 
other disciplines, including law? Is deference due whenever experts are involved in the decision-
making process? 
82 the Van Zyl case (n 25) par 39.
83 Arguably, deference is owed to administrative expertise. However, the content of “administrative 
expertise” requires attention. Dyzenhaus calls for the respect of “administrative determinations”, 
which lends some support to the preceding contention “The politics of deference: judicial review and 
democracy” in Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 279-307 279. Therefore, the 
content of administrative expertise and determinations requires development before an appropriate 
theory of deference can be formulated on this basis.
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The judgment of Langa CJ in MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay
84
 sheds 
some light on these questions, albeit in the context of discrimination rather than 
administrative justice. The applicants contended that deference should be shown 
to school authorities
85
 and that it was a factor to be taken into consideration in 
determining fairness.
86
 They also linked deference to the doctrine of the “margin 
of appreciation” applied by the European court of human rights and the house of 
lords.
87 Langa CJ first points out that “the doctrine [of the margin of appreciation] is 
not a useful guide when deciding either whether a right has been limited or whether 
such a limitation is justified”.88 Then he succinctly disposes of the contention that 
deference is appropriate in the circumstances:
“This court has recognised the need for judicial deference in reviewing administrative decisions 
where the decision-maker is, by virtue of his or her expertise, especially well-qualified to decide. 
It is true that the court must give due weight to the opinion of experts, including school authorities, 
who are particularly knowledgeable in their area, depending on the cogency of their opinions. The 
question before this court, however, is whether the fundamental right to equality has been violated, 
which in turn requires the court to determine what obligations the school bears to accommodate 
diversity reasonably. Those are questions that courts are best qualified and constitutionally 
mandated to answer. This court cannot abdicate its duty by deferring to the school’s view on the 
requirements of fairness. That approach is obviously incorrect for the further reason that it is for 
the school to show that the discrimination was fair. A court cannot defer to the view of a party 
concerning a contention that that same party is bound to prove.”
89
Langa CJ acknowledges the role of deference in the context of judicial review of 
administrative decisions.
90
 However, he seems to indicate that the weight that should 
be attached to the determination of experts depends on the “cogency” of those 
determinations. Thus, it is unclear what the role of deference is, since deference 
seems to amount to no more than according due weight to arguments based on their 
cogency. 
This judgment takes a strong stance on deference in human-rights adjudication 
generally, holding in essence that no deference is due in establishing whether a right 
has been violated. At the same time, the court acknowledges a role for deference 
in administrative-law adjudication, which suggests that adjudication under section 
33 of the constitution is an exception to this general position. This ambivalence 
may be the same as that reflected in the Bato Star case and to a lesser extent in the 
Foodcorp case, where the courts seem to indicate the need for deference to expert 
administrators’ choices as part of a reasonableness assessment on the one hand, but 
insist on retaining an overriding power to test the reasonableness in law on the other 
hand.
The judgments discussed above all dealt with deference as part of the assessment of 
the grounds of review: deference either informed the interpretation of the ground of 
review itself, as was the case in the Bato Star case in relation to reasonableness under 
section 6(2)(h) of the act, or it entered the picture in assessing the administrator’s 
choice against the ground of review, as in the Foodcorp case. In Minister of Defence 
84 2008 1 SA 474 (CC).
85 the Pillay case (n 84) par 26, 80.
86 the Pillay case (n 84) par 79.
87 the Pillay case (n 84) par 80.
88 the Pillay case (n 84) par 80.
89 the Pillay case (n 84) par 81 (footnote omitted).
90 This prompts the question whether deference is only relevant when s 33 of the constitution is applied.
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and Military Veterans v Motau,
91
 however, the court referred to deference as part of 
a threshold assessment of justiciability under administrative law. In this matter the 
court had to decide whether the minister’s removal of two persons from the board 
of directors of a state-owned company is subject to administrative-law review. The 
minister is granted the statutory power to “terminate” any person’s membership of 
the board “on good cause shown”.
92
 The court, however, found that the minister’s 
decision is not reviewable under administrative law, as it does not amount to 
administrative action under the act. The decision is in the court’s view rather a 
purely executive decision linked to the minister’s policy-making functions under 
the relevant statute. The court justified this view by pointing out that executive 
decisions bearing on “particularly sensitive subject matter or policy matters” should 
be shown greater deference by courts.
93
 Such deference is ostensibly shown by 
subjecting the impugned decision to a lighter level of scrutiny under the principle of 
legality rather than the “higher level of scrutiny” of administrative law.
94
Deference is used here both in dealing with the threshold question of justiciability, 
ie determining whether the decision qualifies as administrative action and is subject 
to administrative law, and in considering variable standards of review in general. In 
contrast to the Bato Star case, where the variability of the standard of review was 
dealt with inside administrative law, variability is shifted to the earlier stage of the 
review process in the Motau case. However, deference seems to be a key factor in 
both approaches.
The judgments in which the higher courts have expressly relied on deference 
in reaching their conclusions show very little coherence in their application of 
deference. In most of these cases it is not clear that deference makes any independent 
contribution to the reasoning. In none of these cases is deference given any detailed 
content. The particular stage of the review process in which deference is to play 
a role is also not clear, with varying approaches adopted by the higher courts. At 
best, deference seems to capture aspects of the separation-of-powers doctrine in the 
context of administrative-law review. However, it is clear from the overview above 
of the higher courts’ application of deference that there has as yet been no debate of 
any significance on any of these matters. Instead, deference is simply referenced as 
if it has a self-evident meaning and role to play in adjudication.
In the following section we return to Hoexter’s call for a debate and for the 
development of a theory or notion of deference. We note the work of other scholars 
in this area in an attempt to return to the theoretical basis from which Hoexter made 
her contribution and which, as we shall argue, has largely been side-lined by our 
courts’ enthusiastic adoption of a deference rhetoric. From that basis we engage 
with critiques of deference and in particular with the shortcomings that exist in the 
South African context that may undermine any sensible role for deference in our 
administrative-law system. We then suggest ways in which the debate can be taken 
forward in line with Hoexter’s invitation for such a debate.
[to be concluded]
91 2014 5 SA 69 (CC).
92 s 8(c) of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited Act 51 of 2003. 
93 the Motau case (n 91) par 43.
94 the Motau case (n 91) par 43.
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